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  The venture capital market and firms whose creation and early stages were 
financed by venture capital are among the crown jewels of the American economy.  
Beyond representing an important engine of macroeconomic growth and job creation, 
these firms have been a major force in commercializing cutting edge science, whether 
through their impact on existing industries as with the radical changes in 
pharmaceuticals catalyzed by venture-backed firms commercialization of 
biotechnology, or by the their role in developing entirely new industries as with the 
emergence of the internet and world wide web.  The venture capital market thus 
provides a unique link between finance and innovation, providing start-up and early 
stage firms -- organizational forms particularly well suited to innovation -- with capital 
market access that is tailored to the special task of financing these high risk, high return 
activities.
1 
  It is hardly surprising, then, that other countries have sought to emulate 
American success in developing an effective venture capital market.
2  At a time when 
developing countries are increasingly losing manufacturing jobs to low wage countries, 
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1 For example, Lerner and Kortum report that venture capital backed firms produce more and more 
valuable patents than firms without venture capital backing.  Joshua Lerner & Samuel Kortum, Assessing 
the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation, 31 Rand J. Econ. 674, 674-75 (2000). 
2 “[T]here now exists a wide consensus among economists, business leaders and policy-makers that a 
vibrant venture capital industry is the cornerstone of America’s leadership in the commercialization of 
technological innovation.  A related and widely held belief is that the lack of venture capital hinders 
Europe from competing on equal footing.”  Laura Bottazzi & Marco Da Rin, Venture Capital in Europe 
and the Financing of Innovative Companies, 17 Economic Policy 231, 231 (2002). and when low wage countries seek industries that depend on more than just cheap labor, 
creating a venture capital market has become the holy grail of economic development.
3 
  In this article, I seek to identify the core of the U.S. venture capital contracting 
model, and then assess the extent to which this model provides guidance in fashioning a 
venture capital market in other countries.  This effort proceeds by a number of steps. 
  The analysis builds on what should be a non-controversial premise – that the 
manner in which the U.S. venture capital market developed is not duplicable elsewhere.  
The U.S. venture capital market has a wildly idiosyncratic history that ranges from post-
Gold Rush California, when Stephen Field, David Dudley Field’s more successful 
younger brother, facilitated the adoption in California of his brother’s failed New York 
Civil Code, and thereby planted the seeds for Silicon Valley through the Code’s 
inexplicable prohibition of covenants not to compete, to the World War II Boston area 
research labs, to Frederick Terman’s successful effort to sow the seeds of Silicon Valley 
by linking Stanford University and the emerging electronics industry through the 
creation of the Stanford Industrial Park, to post-World War II political decisions 
concerning how to finance retirement security.
4 
  But while the path along which the U.S. venture capital market developed was 
surely idiosyncratic, the outcome of the development was not.  The argument’s most 
important step is to recognize that the keystone of the U.S. venture capital market is 
private ordering – the contracting structure that developed to manage the extreme 
uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs that inevitably bedevil early 
stage, high technology financing.  Start-up and early stage companies are peculiarly 
suited to commercializing innovation, yet the character of their organization and the 
nature of the activity present inherent barriers to their finance.  The U.S. venture capital 
contracting model manages these barriers and thereby makes early stage financing 
feasible.  The question, then, is whether the U.S. contracting template can be replicated 
elsewhere:  can we engineer a venture capital market? 
                                                 
3 For European Union commentary, see, e.g., European Commission, Risk Capital: A Key to Job Creation 
in the European Union (1998) (http://europa.eu.int./comm/off/com/riskkal); Final Report of the 
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Venture Capital Funds: Evidence from Germany, Israel, Japan and the UK (working paper, April 2002). 
4 Ronald Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 
128, and Covenants not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 575, 588-89; 613-20 (1999). 
  2  The second step in the analysis takes up the engineering problem.  Here the 
difficulty is that replicating the U.S. venture capital contracting structure confronts a 
daunting simultaneity problem.  Three central inputs are necessary to the engineering 
process: capital, specialized financial intermediaries, and entrepreneurs.
5  The problem 
is that each of these inputs will emerge if the other two are present, but none will 
emerge in isolation of the others. 
  This brings us to the third step: who will be the engineer?  The U.S. venture 
capital market developed organically, largely without government assistance and 
certainly without government design.  Countries now seeking to develop a venture 
capital market must necessarily follow a different path than did the U.S., and 
understandably look to government to provide direction when market forces are 
unlikely to solve the simultaneity problem.  As a result, government programs are 
commonplace in countries seeking to develop a venture capital market.  Most such 
programs, however, have been unsuccessful.
6  The reason, I will suggest, is that most 
government programs have tried to deal with the simultaneity problem by having the 
government both provide capital and itself act as the financial intermediary.  Programs 
structured in this fashion fail because the government cannot respond to the trio of 
contracting problems inherent in early stage, high technology financing.  Rather, a 
specialized financial intermediary is necessary for which the government is not a 
substitute.  The point is illustrated by discussion of three different government programs 
– one remarkably unsuccessful early effort in Germany; one more recent, more 
successful program in Israel; and a newly launched program in Chile. 
  The final step in the analysis describes an approach by which the government 
can help engineer a venture capital market.  The approach recognizes that the key to the 
engineering task is solving the simultaneity problem without substituting the 
                                                 
5 Any capital market also requires a range of foundational attributes, like property rights, honest and 
effective courts, and the like.  Detailing the general social and institutional infrastructure necessary to 
support a capital market of any sort is beyond my ambitions here.  For an interesting assay of these issues 
with respect to the necessary preconditions for a stock market, see Bernard Black, the Legal and 
Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L.Rev. 781 (2001).  See also Andrzej 
Rapaczynski, The Role of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights, 10 J. Econ. Perspec. 
87 (1996). 
6 Despite a large number of European government efforts, the European venture capital market remains a 
fraction of the size of the United States market.  Controlling for the size of the economy, in 1995, U.S. 
venture capital financing was eight times the comparable European figure.  Paul Gompers & Joshua 
Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle 326 n.1 (2000).  In 2001, the difference was said to be five times, but 
that figure may be understated because of differences in definition of venture capital in the U.S. and 
Europe.  Bottazzi & Da Rin, supra note 2, at 232. 
  3government, which cannot solve the contracting problems of venture capital financing, 
for critical market participants. 
 
I.  An Overview of the Organizational and Contractual Structure of U.S. 
Venture Capital 
 
  The typical transactional pattern in the U.S. venture capital market is for institutional 
investors – pension funds, banks, insurance companies, and endowments and foundations to 
invest through intermediaries – venture capital limited partnerships, usually called “venture 
capital funds,” in which the investors are passive limited partners.  Venture capital funds are 
typically blind pools.  At the time an institution decides whether to participate in a venture 
capital fund, it receives an offering memorandum that discloses the fund’s investment 
strategy – for example, that the fund will specialize in a particular industry, like the internet, 
or a distinct development stage, like early stage investments.  However, the particular 
companies in which the fund will invest are not yet known.  Consistent with the legal rules 
governing limited partnerships, the limited partners may not participate in the day-to-day 
management of the fund’s business, including especially the approval of particular portfolio 
company investments.
7  In this respect, the venture capital fund’s governance structure 
formalizes the standard Berle-Means problem of the separation of ownership and control.
8  
The general partner (GP) puts up only one percent of the capital, but receives essentially 
complete control over all of it.
9  The particular terms of the fund’s governance are set out in 
the limited partnership agreement.
10 
The GP actually makes and monitors the venture capital fund’s investments.  The GP 
is typically itself a company comprised of investment professionals, which expects to 
continue in the venture capital market by raising successive funds after the capital in a 
                                                 
7 Under Delaware law, the limited partners can make certain extraordinary decisions, such as replacing 
the general partner or terminating the partnership.  See 6 Del.C. §17-303(b)(8)(e).  However, these rights 
are typically restricted by contract.  See Michael C. Halloran, Gregg Vignos & C. Brian Wainwright, 
Agreement of Limited Partnership, in I Venture Capital and Public Offering Negotiation 1-1 through 1-
218 (M. Halloran, R. Gunderson, Jr., & J. del Cavo, eds. 1998) (form of limited partnership agreement 
with commentary).  Venture capital funds frequently do appoint advisory committees, usually made up of 
investor representatives, that monitor the fund’s performance.  See William A. Sahlman, The Structure 
and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J.Fin. Econ. 473, 493 (1990). 
8 Adolph A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932). 
9 Even if one treated the venture capitalist’s carried interest as a measure of the value of its human capital 
contribution, it is still putting up less than 20 percent of the capital but receiving complete control. 
10 See Halloran, et al., Agreement of Limited Partnership, supra note 7, in Venture Capital and Public 
Offering Negotiation (M. Halloran, L. Benton, R. Gunderson, Jr., & J. del Cavo eds. 1998).  Paul 
  4particular fund has been invested in portfolio companies.  This expectation, and the GP’s 
investment in a business infrastructure, provides a powerful performance incentive.  
Commonly, the GP will begin seeking investors for a successor fund by the midpoint of the 
existing fund’s fixed, typically ten-year, term.  At the close of the partnership’s fixed term, 
liquidation is mandatory.  Indeed, the partnership will be in partial liquidation during much 
of its term because realized profits from exiting an investment are required to be distributed 
to the limited partners on an annual basis.
11  The GP’s principal contribution to the venture 
capital fund is expertise, not capital.  This is reflected in the ratio of capital contributions.  In 
most funds, the GP contributes one percent of the fund’s capital, while the limited partner 
investors contribute the remaining 99 percent. 
The GP’s compensation is also skewed.  The GP usually receives an annual 
management fee for its services, but the fee is relatively small, usually 2.5 percent of 
committed capital.
12  The primary return to the general partner is a carried interest – that is, a 
right to receive a specified percentage of profits realized by the partnership.  Twenty percent 
is a common figure.
13  The GP generally is paid its carried interest at the same time that 
distributions are made to the limited partners, subject to two limitations.  First, general 
partners typically receive no distributions until the limited partners have received an amount 
equal to their capital contributions, sometimes with interest.  Second, distributions to the GP 
are subject to certain “claw back” provisions that ensure that the order of distribution does 
not affect the ultimate percentage of profits received by the GP. 
  The venture capital fund’s equity investments in portfolio companies typically take 
the form of convertible preferred stock.
14 While not required by the formal legal documents, 
                                                                                                                                               
Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Limited 
Partnerships, 39 L.& Econ. 463 (1996), examines the terms of such agreements. 
11 Sahlman, supra note 7, at 491-92; Agreement of Limited Partnership, supra note 11, at 1-62 to 1-72. 
12 Id., at 491; In most cases, the agreement provides for a breakpoint above which the management fee is 
reduced, either on funds under management of number of years after the partnership's formation.  
Halloran, et al., Limited Partnership Agreement, supra note 7. 
13 Sahlman, supra note 7, at 491; Halloran, et al., Agreement of Limited Partnership, supra note 7, at 1-46; 
Paul Gompers & Joshua Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle 32 (2000).  
14 Paul Gompers, Ownership and Control in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Examination of Convertible 
Securities in Venture Capital Investments, Harvard Business School Working Paper (Sept. 1997); 
Sahlman, supra note 7, at 36.  Steven Kaplan & Pers Stromberg report that convertible preferred stock 
was used in 95 percent of a sample of 200 financing rounds in 118 portfolio companies made by 14 
venture capital firms between 1996 and 1999.  Steven Kaplan & Pers Stromberg, Financial Contracting 
Theory Meets the Real World, NBER Working Paper 7660 (April 2000).  Ronald Gilson and David 
Schizer argue that this consistency is driven by the tax efficiency of this capital structure in delivering 
high powered incentives to management.  Ronald J. Gilson & David Schizer, Understanding Venture 
Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock (Working Paper, March 2002, 
forthcoming, Harvard L. Rev.).  This paper is available at 
http://papers:ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=301225. 
  5the fund is also expected to make important non-cash contributions to the portfolio company.  
These contributions consist of management assistance, corresponding to that provided by 
management consultants; intensive monitoring of the portfolio company’s performance 
which provides an objective view to the entrepreneur; and the use of the fund’s reputation to 
give the portfolio company credibility with potential customers, suppliers, and employees.
15  
While each investment will have a “lead” investor who plays the primary role in monitoring 
and advising the portfolio company, commonly the overall investment is syndicated with 
other venture capital funds that invest in the portfolio company at the same time and on the 
same terms.
16  
The initial venture capital investment usually will be insufficient to fund the portfolio 
company’s entire business plan.  Accordingly, investment will be "staged."  A particular 
investment round will provide only the capital the business plan projects as necessary to 
achieve specified milestones set out in the business plan.
17  While first round investors 
expect to participate in subsequent investment rounds,
18 often they are not contractually 
obligated to do so even if the business plan’s milestones are met; the terms of later rounds of 
investment are negotiated at the time the milestones are met and the prior investment 
exhausted.  Like the provision of non-capital contributions, implicit, not explicit contract 
typically governs the venture capital fund’s right and obligation to provide additional rounds 
of financing if the portfolio company performs as expected.  The venture capital fund’s 
implicit right to participate in subsequent rounds – by contrast to its implicit obligation to 
participate – is protected by an explicit right of first refusal.
19 
                                                 
15 Bernard Black & Ronald Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks versus 
Stock Markets 243, 252-255 (1998); Thomas Hellman, Venture Capitalists: The Coaches of Silicon 
Valley, in The Silicon Valley Edge: A Habitat for Innovation and Entrepreneurship (Chong-Moon Lee, 
W.F. Miller, M. Gong Hancock & H.S. Rowen eds; 2000); Thomas Hellman & Manju Puri, Venture 
Capital and the Professionalization of Start-up Firms: Empirical Evidence, 57 J. Fin. 169 (2002). 
16 Josh Lerner, The Syndication of Venture Capital, 23 Fin. Mngmnt. 16, 18 (1994). 
17 See Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital, 50 J. Fin. 
1461 (1995). 
18 Sahlman, supra note 7, at 475, reports that venture capital funds invest one-third of their capital in new 
investments and two-thirds in later round financing of companies already in their portfolios. 
19 Kaplan and Stromberg report that some 15 percent of the financing rounds in their sample conditioned 
disbursement of a portion of the round on explicit contingencies.  Many of these, however, are not 
inconsistent with the unconstrained option to abandon analysis in the text.  First, in some number of these 
instances, subsequent financing was contingent on “no material deviation” from the business plan.  
Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 14, at Table 6.  While such a formulation does operate to make exercise 
of the option to abandon reviewable by a court, it hardly represents state contingent contracting and still 
leaves the venture capitalist with a great deal of discretion.  Since material changes in a business plan are 
predictable given the nature of an early stage business, in most cases the material deviation contingency 
will collapse into a pure option to abandon.  Second, contingencies are keyed to readily observable and 
verifiable events like the issuance of a patent, or the hiring of a chief executive officer, again instances 
when a specific uncertainty can be specified and its resolution observed.  Finally, Kaplan and Stromberg 
  6A critical feature of the governance structure created by the venture capital fund’s 
investment in the portfolio company is the disproportionate allocation of control to the 
fund.
20  In direct contrast to the familiar Berle-Means governance structure of outside 
investors having disproportionately less control than equity, the governance structure of a 
venture capital-backed early stage, high technology company allocates to the venture capital 
investors disproportionately greater control than equity.  It is common for venture capital 
investors to have the right to name a majority of a portfolio company’s directors even though 
their stock represents less than a majority of the portfolio company’s voting power.
21  
Additionally, the portfolio company will have the benefit of a series of contractual negative 
covenants that require the venture capital investors’ approval before the portfolio company 
can take important business decisions, such as acquisition or disposition of significant 
amounts of assets, or a material deviation from the business plan.  The extent of these 
negative covenants is related to whether the venture capital investors have control of the 
board of directors; board control acts as a partial substitute for covenant restrictions.
22  
These formal levers of control are complemented by the informal control elements 
that result from the staged financing structure.  Because a financing round will not provide 
funds sufficient to complete the portfolio company’s business plan, staged financing in effect 
delegates to the investors, in the form of the decision whether to provide additional 
financing, the decision whether and how to continue the company’s project.
23 
Two final characteristics of investments in portfolio companies concern their terms 
and their expected performance.  While these are not short-term investments, neither are they 
expected to be long-term.  Because venture capital limited partnerships have limited, usually 
                                                                                                                                               
do not suggest that the venture capitalists are committed to provide future financing rounds even in the 
minority of rounds where explicit contingencies are found.  Taken as a whole, their data leaves intact the 
general proposition that venture financing is staged, without binding future commitments by existing 
venture investors. 
20 Gompers, Ownership and Control, supra note 14. 
21 In Gomper’s sample of portfolio company investments, venture capital investors on average controlled 
the portfolio company’s board of directors, but held only 41 percent of the equity.  Id.  The venture 
capital fund’s right to select a specified number of directors is contained in the portion of the portfolio 
company’s articles of incorporation that sets out the rights, preferences and privileges of the convertible 
preferred stock the investors receive.  This portion of the articles will typically be added by amendment 
simultaneously with the closing of the venture capital investment.  L. Benton & Robert Gunderson, Jr., 
Portfolio Company Investments: High-Tech Corporation, in Venture Capital and Public Offering 
Negotiation (M. Halloran, L. Benton, R. Gunderson, Jr., & J. del Cavo eds. 1998), sets out a standard 
form of restated articles of incorporation in connection with a convertible preferred stock venture capital 
financing. 
22 See Gompers, Ownership and Control, supra note 14.  The negative covenants are contained in a 
different closing document, the investors rights agreement.  Benton & Gunderson, supra note 21, sets out 
a form of investors rights agreement with illustrative negative covenants. 
23 Gompers, Ownership and Control, supra note 14; Anat Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Robust Financial 
Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists, 49 J. Fin. 371, 371 (1994). 
  710 year terms,
24 GP’s have a strong incentive to cause the fund’s portfolio company 
investments to become liquid as quickly as possible.  Assuming that the GP has invested all 
of a fund’s capital by the midpoint of the fund’s life, the GP then must seek to raise 
additional capital for a new fund in order to remain in the venture capital business.  Because 
the performance of a GP’s prior funds will be an important determinant of its ability to raise 
capital for a new fund, early harvesting of a fund’s investments will be beneficial.
25  Venture 
capital funds exit successful investments by two general methods: taking the portfolio 
company public through an initial public offering of its stock (an “IPO”); or selling the 
portfolio company to another firm.  The likelihood of exit by an IPO or a sale has differed 
over different periods.  Between 1984 and 1990, 396 venture capital-backed firms went 
public, while 628 such firms were sold to other firms before going public.  Between 1991 
and 1996, the order reversed, with 1059 firms going public and 524 being sold.
26  It is also 
common for the terms of a venture capital preferred stock investment to give the venture 
capital fund the right to require the portfolio company to redeem its stock.  However, 
redemption does not operate as a viable exit mechanism because portfolio companies lack 
the funds to affect the redemption.
27  Such put rights are better understood as a control 
device that can force the portfolio company to accommodate the fund’s desire to exit by way 
of IPO or sale. 
The fact that portfolio company investments are of limited duration rather than long 
term is critical to the operation of the venture capital market.
28  The non-cash contributions 
made by the venture capital fund to the portfolio company – management assistance, 
monitoring, and service as a reputational intermediary – share a significant economy of 
scope with its provision of capital.  The portfolio company must evaluate the quality of the 
fund’s proffered management assistance and monitoring, just as potential employees, 
suppliers and customers must evaluate the fund’s representations concerning the portfolio 
company’s quality.  Combining financial and nonfinancial contributions enhances the 
credibility of the information the venture capital fund proposes to provide the portfolio 
                                                 
24 Halloran, et al., supra note 7, at 1-20, 
25 Black & Gilson, supra note 15, at 255-57.  This incentive may cause a GP without a performance 
record with prior funds to harvest investments earlier than would be optimal for the investors in order to 
establish a record sufficient to allow the raising of a new fund.  See Gompers, Ownership and Control, 
supra note 14.  
26 Black & Gilson, supra note 15, at 248 (Table 1); Paul Gompers, Grandstanding in the Venture Capitals 
Industry, 42 J.Fin. Econ. 133 (1996). 
27 Black & Gilson, supra note 15; Gompers, Ownership & Control, supra note 14.  Kaplan & Stromberg, 
supra note 14, report redemption rights in 84 percent of the financing rounds in their sample. 
28 This discussion draws on Black & Gilson, supra note 15.  
  8company and third parties.  Put simply, the venture capital fund bonds the accuracy of its 
information with its investment.  
The importance of the portfolio company investment’s limited duration reflects the 
fact that the venture capital fund’s non-cash contributions have special value to early stage 
companies.  As the portfolio company gains its own experience and develops its own 
reputation, the value of the venture capital fund’s provision of those elements declines.  By 
the time a portfolio company succeeds and the venture capital fund’s exit from the 
investment is possible, the fund’s non-cash contributions can be more profitably invested in a 
new round of early stage companies.  But because of the economies of scope between cash 
and non-cash contributions, recycling the venture capital fund’s non-cash contributions also 
requires recycling its cash contributions.  Exit from a fund’s investments in successful 
portfolio companies thus serves to recycle its cash and, therefore, its associated non-cash 
contributions from successful companies to early stage companies. 
The risk associated with portfolio company investments is reflected in the variability 
of returns.  While some investments return many multiples of the original investment, a 
survey of the performance of venture capital-backed companies, not limited to early stage 
technology companies and therefore presenting less uncertainty than the category of 
investments that concern us here, reports wide variation in returns.  In the sample studied, 50 
percent of the total return was provided by only 6.8 percent of the investments.  Over a third 
of the investments resulted in partial or total loss.
29 
 
II.  The Economics of Venture Capital Contracting: the Special Problems of 
Uncertainty, Information Asymmetry, and Agency Costs 
 
  All financial contracts respond to three central problems: uncertainty, information 
asymmetry, and opportunism in the form of agency costs.  The special character of venture 
capital contracting is shaped by the fact that investing in early stage, high technology 
companies presents these problems in extreme form.
30  Precisely because the portfolio 
                                                 
29 Venture Economics, Exiting Venture Capital Investments (1988)[This high variance is confirmed by a 
more recent econometric study.  See John H. Cochran, The Risk and Return of Venture Capital, NBER 
Working Paper 8066 (Jan. 2001) (“Venture Capital returns are like options; they have a small chance of a 
huge pay off.”). 
30 George Triantis makes the apt point that bank financing of mature firms has functional parallels to 
venture capital contracting.  For example, lines of credit that can be cancelled by the lender is a form of 
staged financing.  George Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68 U.Chi. 
L. Rev. 305, 306  (2001).  However, the combination of the portfolio company’s negative cash flow, as 
well as the more extreme form of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency leads to the use of 
  9company is at an early stage, uncertainty concerning future performance is magnified.  
Virtually all of the important decisions bearing on the company’s success remain to be made, 
and most of the significant uncertainties concerning the outcome of the company’s efforts 
remain unresolved.  Additional uncertainty concerns the quality of the company’s 
management, which takes on heightened importance because so large a portion of the 
portfolio company’s value depends on management’s future decisions.  Finally, the 
technology base of the portfolio company’s business exacerbates the general uncertainty by 
adding scientific uncertainty. 
  The same factors expand the information asymmetries between potential investors 
and entrepreneurs, as intentions and abilities are far less observable than actions already 
taken.  Similarly, the fact that the portfolio company’s technology involves cutting edge 
science assures that a substantial information asymmetry in favor of the entrepreneur even if 
the venture capital fund employs individuals with advanced scientific training.  
Finally, the importance of future managerial decisions in an early stage company 
whose value depends almost entirely on future growth options, creates potentially very large 
agency costs,
31 which are in turn amplified by the significant variance associated with an 
early stage, high technology company’s expected returns.  Because the entrepreneur’s stake 
in a portfolio company with venture capital financing can be fairly characterized as an 
option, the entrepreneur’s interests will sharply diverge from those of the venture capital 
investors, especially with respect to the risk level and duration of the investment.
32 
  The organizational and contractual structure of the U.S. venture capital market 
responds to this trio of problems.  The effectiveness of the response serves to make the 
venture capital market feasible.  Absent a workable response, the extremity of uncertainty, 
information asymmetry, and agency problems likely would raise the cost of external capital 
to a point of market failure, leading to a similar collapse in the formation of early stage, high 
technology companies.  Because of the link between firm size and innovation,
33 institutional 
and contractual techniques thus have an important influence on the successful 
                                                                                                                                               
equity-like instruments and a level of control quite different from banking practice.  This is consistent 
with the fact that “Venture” funding in Europe by banks is characterized by late stage investments in low 
technology industries – circumstances when these contracting problems are more muted.  See Mayer, 
Schoors & Yafeh, supra note 3.   
31 Gompers, Ownership and Control, supra note 14. 
32 For a discussion on the characterization of a corporate stock as an option, see Fischer Black & Myron 
Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J.Pol. Econ. 637 (1973); Stewart Myers, 
Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J.Fin. Econ. 147 (1977).  The application of option pricing 
analysis to transactional and contractual structuring is developed in Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, 
The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions Ch. 7 (2d ed. 1995). 
33 See Lerner & Kortum, note 1, supra. 
  10commercialization of cutting edge science.  Research and development by large companies 
with access to the public capital markets simply is not a substitute for the activities of early 
stage companies, financed through the private equity market, and dependent on contractual 
solutions to the problems of uncertainty, information asymmetry and agency costs.
34 
  The organizational and contractual techniques observed in the venture capital market 
reflect three basic characteristics.  First, very high power incentives for all participants – 
investors, GPs, and entrepreneurs – are coupled with very intense monitoring.
35  Second, the 
organizational and contractual structure reflects the use of both explicit and implicit 
contracts.  Thus, the governance structure of both the portfolio company and the venture 
capital fund is composed of market as well as formal aspects.  Third, a pivotal aspect of this 
mix of formal and market governance, especially repeat play and reputation mechanisms, is 
that the two contracting nodes which comprise the venture capital market – the venture 
capital fund limited partnership agreement and the portfolio company investment contract – 
are determined simultaneously.  As we will see, this braiding of the two relationships 
facilitates the resolution of problems internal to each. 
  This Part shows how multiple forms of incentive and monitoring techniques, 
including contractual, control, and market mechanisms, operate in connection with each 
contracting node to resolve the problems of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency 
associated with early stage, high technology financing.  We consider first the venture capital 
fund-portfolio company contract and then turn to the investor-venture capital fund limited 
partnership agreement.  Finally, we consider the importance of the braiding of these two 
contracts. 
  A.  The Venture Capital Fund-Portfolio Company Contract 
  Five organizational and contractual techniques discussed in Part I – staged financing, 
allocation of elements of control, form of compensation, the role of exit, and reliance on 
implicit contracts – respond to the problems posed by financial contracting in the face of 
extreme forms of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs.   
    1.  Staged Financing.  By giving the investor a valuable option to abandon, 
the staged financing structure discussed in Part I responds directly to the uncertainty 
associated with contracting for early stage, high technology investments.  The milestones in 
                                                 
34 See Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-ups?, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 289 (1999) (discussion of 
advantages of start-up form). 
35 This is consistent with Milgrom & Roberts “monitoring intensity principle,” which predicts that 
because intense incentives give rise not only to incentives to perform but also to incentives to cheat, 
  11the business plan are keyed to events that, when they occur, reveal important information 
and thereby reduce the uncertainty associated with the project’s ultimate success.  Thus, a 
first milestone may be the creation of an operating prototype, which eliminates uncertainty 
about the portfolio company’s ability to reduce its science to a commercial product.  The 
decision about additional investment is then made only after the passage of time and 
performance has replaced projection with fact.  The result is to reduce the uncertainty 
associated with the funding of further rounds of investment.
36 
  Without more, however, staged financing does not increase the expected value of the 
portfolio company's project.  To be sure, the investor receives an option to abandon, but the 
value of that option to the recipient is exactly balanced by the cost of the option to its writer, 
the entrepreneur.  Absent an unrealistic assumption about investor risk aversion, merely 
shifting exogenous uncertainty from the investor to the entrepreneur does not create value.
37  
For this to occur, staged financing must accomplish something more. 
  The first respect in which staged financing creates, rather than merely transfers, value 
is its reduction in the agency problems associated with the entrepreneur’s management of the 
portfolio company’s operation.  Staged financing aligns the interests of the venture capital 
fund and the entrepreneur by creating a substantial performance incentive.  If the portfolio 
company does not meet the milestone whose completion was funded in the initial round of 
financing, the venture capital fund has the power to shut the project down by declining to 
fund the project’s next round.
38  Even if the venture capital fund chooses to continue the 
portfolio company’s project by providing another round of financing, a performance penalty 
still can be imposed by assigning the portfolio company a lower value in the new round.  To 
be sure, the portfolio company may seek financing from other sources if the existing 
investors decline to go forward, or are willing to go forward only at an unfavorable price, but 
the overall contractual structure significantly reduces the availability of a market alternative. 
                                                                                                                                               
intense incentives require a significant investment in monitoring.  Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 
Economics, Organization & Management, Ch. 7 (1992). 
36 Brealey & Myers contains an accessible discussion of how to value the option to abandon.  Richard A. 
Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, 622-25 (6th ed. 2000). 
37 Indeed, the more realistic assumption is that the entrepreneur is risk averse with respect to the success 
of the portfolio company since, unlike the venture capital fund, she will not hold a diversified portfolio of 
financial or human capital. 
38 The venture capital fund’s non-capital contributions are also effectively staged.  If the portfolio 
company has not performed satisfactorily, the GP can decline to make or receive telephone calls from the 
portfolio company or its suppliers, customers, or prospective employees.  See Black & Gilson, supra note 
15, at 254. Gompers, Optimal Investment, supra note 17, at 1462, likens this incentive to that by the role 
of debt in a leveraged buyout.  The need for additional funds provides a portfolio company the same 
“hard” constraint provided by the need to pay back debt in a leveraged buyout.   
  12First, potential investors know they are being solicited only because investors in the 
prior round are dissatisfied with the portfolio company’s performance.  Second, the investors 
rights agreement gives the venture capital fund a right of first refusal with respect to future 
financing that serves as a substantial deterrent to potential alternative investors.  Such an 
investor will be reluctant to make the outlay to acquire the information necessary to deciding 
whether to make an investment knowing that that investment will be significantly reduced if 
the terms negotiated turn out to be attractive, since the existing investors will have the right 
to take part or all of the transaction for themselves.  The result is a serious winner’s curse 
problem.  The potential investor can anticipate that if the price negotiated is attractive, the 
existing investors will opt to make the investment themselves.  Thus, the potential investor 
knows that it will be allowed to make the investment only if the existing investors, who have 
better information about the project, believe that the investment is unattractive.   
Staged financing also reduces agency costs by shifting the decision whether to 
continue the project from the entrepreneur to the venture capital fund.  Because of the 
option-like character of the entrepreneur’s interest in the portfolio company, she will go 
forward with the project under conditions that favor her and disfavor the venture capital 
fund.  Shifting this decision to the venture capital fund reduces this source of agency cost. 
The incentive created by staged financing in turn operates to reduce uncertainty in a 
manner that creates value, rather than merely shifting it from the investor to the entrepreneur.  
While staged financing only shifts risk with respect to exogenous uncertainty – that is, 
uncertainty which is outside the parties’ capacity to influence – it actually can serve to reduce 
a different kind of uncertainty.  Some uncertainty associated with the success of the portfolio 
company’s project is endogenous: it can be influenced by the entrepreneur’s actions.  Put 
differently, the likelihood of the portfolio company’s success is in part a function of the 
effort expended.  By increasing the incentives to expend effort, staged financing reduces this 
element of uncertainty.  
That brings us to the effect of staged financing on the information asymmetry 
between the venture capital fund and the entrepreneur.  Staged financing serves to bridge the 
information gap in two important ways.  First, every incentive has an information related flip 
side that responds to adverse selection problems.  In deciding which portfolio companies to 
finance, the venture capital fund has to distinguish between good and bad entrepreneurs 
under circumstances in which an entrepreneur has better information about her own skills 
than does the investor.  Because the incentive created by staged financing is more valuable to 
a good entrepreneur than a bad one, an entrepreneur’s willingness to accept an intense 
  13incentive is a signal of the entrepreneur’s difficult to observe skills.  The signal is particularly 
important for early stage and high technology portfolio companies because the absence of a 
performance history and the technical nature of the projects makes the entrepreneur’s skills 
particularly difficult to observe.
39 
Staged financing reduces information asymmetry in a second way by its impact on 
the credibility of the projections contained in the entrepreneur’s business plan.  These 
projections are critical to valuing the portfolio company and therefore pricing the venture 
capital fund’s investment.  Yet, the entrepreneur obviously has better information concerning 
the accuracy of the business plan’s projections of timing, costs, and likelihood of success.  
Without more, the entrepreneur has an obvious incentive to overstate the project's prospects.  
By accepting a contractual structure that imposes significant penalties if the entrepreneur 
fails to meets specified milestones based on the business plan’s projections -- the venture 
capital fund's option to abandon then becomes exercisable -- the entrepreneur makes those 
projections credible. 
At this point, it is helpful to note a more general contracting problem associated with 
the allocation of discretion between parties to an agreement.  Discretion creates the potential 
for the party possessing it to impose agency costs. Staged financing, like other organizational 
and contractual techniques we will consider, responds to agency problems that result from 
entrepreneur discretion by shifting that discretion to the venture capital fund.  However, this 
technique has a built in limitation, which we might call the principle of the conservation of 
discretion.  Without more, shifting discretion from the entrepreneur to the fund does not 
eliminate the potential for agency costs; it merely shifts the chance to act opportunistically to 
the fund.  For example, staged financing coupled with a right of first refusal made potent by 
high information costs allows the venture capital fund to behave opportunistically in 
negotiating the price of a second round of financing.  The fund is in a position to exploit its 
monopsony power by reducing the value assigned to the portfolio company even though it 
has met its projections.
40  In such settings, the goal is to shift discretion to that party whose 
misuse of it can be most easily constrained, here the venture capital fund.
41  As will appear, 
                                                 
39 Conceptually, the signal will result in a separating equilibrium, in which only high quality 
entrepreneurs will accept the incentive, when the low quality entrepreneurs’ alternatives are more 
valuable to a low quality entrepreneur than the incentive contract.  See Gompers, Ownership and Control, 
supra note 11, Edward Lazear, Salaries and Piece – Rates, 59 J. Bus. 405 (1986). 
40 Black & Gilson, supra note 15, at 261-63. 
41 In their discussion of the efficient allocation of property rights in innovation between the innovation 
and the investor, Phillip Aghion and Jean Tirole do not consider the problem of dual-sided moral hazard 
considered in the text.  Rather, ownership should be allocated to investor or innovator based on size of 
  14misuse of the discretion shifted to the venture capital fund is policed by market forces in the 
venture capital market, whose functioning is crucial to the feasibility of the entire 
organizational and contractual structure. 
  2.  Control.  The venture capital fund-portfolio company contract stands the 
Berle-Means problem on its head.  Instead of investors having disproportionately less control 
than equity as in public corporations, the venture capital fund has disproportionately more 
control than equity.  Like staged financing, this allocation of control responds to the 
problems of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency associated with early stage, 
high technology investments. 
Extreme uncertainty concerning the course and outcome of the project stage being 
financed creates discretion.  The presence of uncertainty means that the financing contract is 
necessarily incomplete; an explicit stage contingent contract that specifies what action should 
be taken in response to all possible events cannot be written.  Thus, the contractual structure 
must deal with uncertainty by means of a governance structure: creating a process that will 
determine the response to an unexpected event.  The particular allocation of discretion 
between the fund and the portfolio company reflects the influence of concerns over both 
agency and information asymmetry. 
  Two types of control are allocated to the venture capital fund as a response to agency 
and information asymmetry problems.  First, as we have seen, staged financing allocates an 
important periodic lever of control to the venture capital fund.  By reserving to itself the 
decision whether to fund the portfolio company’s next milestone, the venture capital fund 
takes control over the continuation decision.  This power, in turn, gives the venture capital 
fund the incentive to make the investment in monitoring necessary to evaluate the portfolio 
company’s overall performance over the initial funding period.  In the absence of the power 
to act in response to what it discovers, the venture capital fund would have no reason to 
expend time and resources in the kind of monitoring necessary to balance the intense 
incentives created to align the two parties’ interests. 
  Second, giving the venture capital fund disproportionate representation or even 
control of the portfolio company’s board of directors, and the restriction of the entrepreneur’s 
discretion through the use of negative covenants, gives the fund interim control – the power 
to act to reduce agency costs in the period between financing rounds.  In its most extreme 
form, the venture capital fund’s interim control carries with it the power to replace the 
                                                                                                                                               
marginal contribution.  Phillip Aghion & Jean Tirole, The management of Innovation, 109 Q.J. Econ. 
1185 (1994). 
  15entrepreneur as the portfolio company’s chief executive officer.  As with the allocation of 
periodic control, the allocation of interim control gives the venture capital fund the incentive 
to monitor the portfolio company’s performance during the course of reaching a funding 
milestone, and in response to the unexpected events generated by pervasive uncertainty.  The 
discretion unavoidably given to the portfolio company’s day to day managers by the 
occurrence of unexpected events is policed by the disproportionate control and resulting 
monitoring activity allocated to the venture capital fund. 
  The periodic and interim monitoring encouraged by the disproportionate allocation 
of control to the venture capital fund also serves to reduce the last of the contracting 
problems – information asymmetry between the venture capital fund and the entrepreneur.  
The balance of information between the parties is not static as the portfolio company moves 
forward on its business plan.  Ongoing learning by the entrepreneur increases the 
information disparity and therefore the entrepreneur's discretion, which in turn increases 
agency costs.  Ongoing monitoring by the venture capital fund, made possible by the 
disproportionate allocation of control, balances that influence. 
  Finally, as with staged financing, the allocation of control serves to reduce 
information asymmetry by providing the entrepreneur the opportunity to signal her type.  
Giving the venture capital fund the power to terminate the entrepreneur in the event of poor 
performance gives the entrepreneur a powerful incentive to perform.  The flip side of this 
incentive is a signal.  By her willingness to subject herself to this penalty for poor 
performance, the entrepreneur credibly provides information to the venture capital fund 
about her own skills. 
  3.    Compensation.  The structure of the entrepreneur’s compensation 
responds primarily to agency costs and information asymmetry problems.  Perhaps more 
starkly than with any other organizational or contractual technique, the portfolio company’s 
compensation structure creates extremely high powered performance incentives that serve to 
align the incentives of the portfolio company management and the venture capital fund.  In 
essence, the overwhelming percentage of management’s compensation is dependent on the 
portfolio company’s success.  Low salaries are offset by the potential for a large increase in 
value of the entrepreneur’s stock ownership, and by the award of stock options to other 
management members.  The performance incentive is further heightened by the practice of 
requiring the entrepreneur and other members of management to accept the imposition of a 
  16staged vesting requirement on some or all of their stock or stock options.
42  The vesting 
requirement gives the portfolio company the right to purchase a portion of the entrepreneur’s 
or other management’s stock, at a favorable price, if employment terminates prior to a series 
of specified dates.  It also restricts exercise of options until after the manager has completed a 
series of employment anniversaries, following each of which an additional number of 
options both are exercisable and no longer subject to forfeiture if employment terminates.
43 
  While aligning the interests of the venture capital fund and entrepreneur in some 
circumstances, the intensity of these incentives can also lead to agency costs in others.  In 
particular, the option-like characteristics of the portfolio company’s compensation structure 
can lead the entrepreneur to increase the risk associated with the portfolio company’s future 
returns, because the venture capital fund will bear a disproportionate share of the increased 
downside but share only proportionately in the upside.  Thus, the intensity of the 
performance incentives created by the compensation structure gives rise to a corresponding 
incentive for the venture capital fund to monitor the portfolio company’s performance.  This 
monitoring, together with the signaling properties of the entrepreneur’s willingness to accept 
such powerful incentives, also serve to reduce information asymmetries. 
  4.    Exit.    Another powerful incentive is created for the entrepreneur by the 
terms of the disproportionate allocation of control to the venture capital fund.  On the 
plausible assumption that the transfer of control to the venture capital is costly to the 
entrepreneur,
44 the control structure created by the venture capital fund’s investment gives 
the entrepreneur a valuable call option on control.
45  In effect, the venture capital fund and 
the entrepreneur enter into a combination explicit and implicit contract that returns to the 
entrepreneur the disproportionate control transferred to the venture capital fund if the 
portfolio company is successful.
 46  The explicit portion of the contract is reflected in the 
terms of the convertible preferred stock that provide the venture capital fund its 
                                                 
42 See Thomas Hellmann, The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts, 29 Rand 
J.Econ. 57 (1998).  Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 14, report that 55 percent of early stage financings 
contained entrepreneur vesting requirements. 
 
43 Sahlman, supra note 7, at 507; Benton & Gunderson, supra note 21. 
44 A private value for control is a standard feature in models that seek to explain the incentive function of 
capital structure.  See e.g., Bengt Holstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm III.  Capital Structure, 
in I.  Handbook of Industrial Organization 63, 79-86 (Richard Schmualansee & Robert Willigs, eds., 
1989); Milton Harris & Arthur Raviv, Corporate Governance: Voting Rights and Majority Rule, 20 J.Fin. 
Econ. 203 (1988); Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate 
Control, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 175 (1988). 
45 Black & Gilson, supra note 15, develop the concept of an implicit contract giving the entrepreneur a 
call option on control in venture capital contracts. 
  17disproportionate board representation, and in those of the investors’ rights agreement that 
contains the negative covenants requiring venture capital fund approval of important 
operating decisions.  Both documents typically provide for the termination of these levers of 
control on the completion of an IPO of a specified size and at a specified price.  The terms of 
the preferred stock almost universally require conversion into common stock, with the 
resulting disappearance of special board representation, on a public offering.  The negative 
covenants also expire on an IPO.
47 
  The implicit portion of the contract operationalizes the definition of success that 
makes the entrepreneur’s call option on control exercisable.  By triggering automatic 
conversion on an IPO, the measure of success is delegated to independent investment 
bankers who are in the business of identifying venture capital-backed companies successful 
enough to be taken public,
48 and whose own incentives make their ex post determination of 
success credible ex ante.  As we will see in the next section, it also allocates to the market 
enforcement of the venture capital fund’s implicit promise to agree to an IPO when one is 
available to the portfolio company and the entrepreneur exercises her call option on control 
by requesting one. 
    5.  Reliance on Implicit Contract: The Role of the Reputation Market.  
Crucial elements of the organizational and contractual techniques that respond to uncertainty, 
information asymmetry, and agency costs in the venture capital fund-portfolio company 
relationship, have at their core the transfer of discretion from the entrepreneur to the venture 
capital fund.  Staged financing, by giving the venture capital fund an option to abandon, 
transfers the continuation decision from the entrepreneur to the fund.  Board control by the 
venture capital fund, including the power to dismiss the entrepreneur herself, 
disproportionate to its equity, also transfers to the fund the capacity to interfere in the 
portfolio company’s day to day business.  As a result, the effectiveness of these techniques is 
subject to the conservation of discretion principle.  Reducing the agency costs of the 
entrepreneur’s discretion by transferring it to the venture capital fund also transfers to the 
                                                                                                                                               
46 Some contracts also provide for automatic conversion when the portfolio company meets specified 
profit or, less frequently, sales targets.  Gompers, Ownership & Control, supra note 14. 
47 The venture capital fund’s ownership percentage, and therefore control, is further diluted both by the 
number of new shares sold to the public in the IPO, and by the number of shares sold by the venture 
capital fund either in the offering or in the period following the offering.  Black & Gilson, supra note 15, 
at 260-61. 
48 See Alan Brau & Paul A. Gompers, Myth or Reality?  The Long Run Underperformance of Initial 
Public Offerings:  Evidence from Venture and Non-Venture Backed Companies, 52 J. Fin. 1791 (1997); 
William L. Megginson & Kathleen A. Weiss, Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial Public Offerings, 
46 J. Fin. 879 (1991); Christopher Barry, Chris Muscarella, John Peavy III & Michael R. Vestsypens, The 
Role of Venture Capitalists in the Creation of a Public Company, 27 J.Fin. Econ. 447 (1990). 
  18venture capitalist the potential for agency costs – the opportunity to use that discretion 
opportunistically with respect to the entrepreneur.   
For example, giving the venture capital fund an option to abandon gives the venture 
capital fund an incentive to monitor, gives the entrepreneur an incentive to perform, and 
reduces agency costs by shifting the continuation decision to the venture capitalist.  But 
when coupled with the venture capital fund’s right of first refusal, this transfer of discretion 
also creates agency costs on the part of the venture capital fund.  What prevents the venture 
capital fund from opportunistically offering to provide the financing necessary for the 
portfolio company’s next stage only at an unfairly low price, relying on a right of first refusal 
to restrict the entrepreneur’s access to other sources of funding?
49  Similarly, the transfer of 
disproportionate control to the venture capital fund also creates the potential for opportunism 
by the fund.  To align incentives, the entrepreneur’s returns from the portfolio company’s 
project take the form of appreciation in the value of her portfolio company stock and stock 
options.  However, the venture capital fund’s power to terminate the entrepreneur, coupled 
with the vesting requirements that on her termination both give the portfolio company a 
favorably priced option to purchase the entrepreneur’s stock and cancel all unvested options, 
gives the venture capital fund the discretion to behave opportunistically.  What prevents the 
venture capital fund from unfairly terminating the entrepreneur so as to secure for itself the 
returns that had been promised the entrepreneur? 
The conservation of discretion principle counsels that discretion be vested in the 
party whose behavior is more easily policed.  In the context of the venture capital fund-
portfolio company relationship, the presence of an effective reputation market with respect to 
the GP’s characteristics provides the policing that supports the transfer of discretion to the 
venture capital fund.  Put differently, the feasibility of the explicit contract for venture capital 
financing, made up of hundreds of pages of carefully drafted language, depends on the 
operation of an implicit contract whose terms and enforcement rest with a market. 
For a reputation market to operate, three attributes must be present.  First, the party 
whose discretion will be policed by the market must anticipate repeated future transactions; 
market penalties for breach of the implicit require future dealings.  Second, participants in 
the market must have shared expectations of what constitutes appropriate behavior by the 
party to whom discretion has been transferred; that is, the terms of the implicit contract must 
be observable to market participants.  Finally, those who will deal with the advantaged party 
                                                 
49 See TAN __ supra.. 
  19in the future must be able to observe whether that party has behaved in past dealings in 
conformity with shared expectations; that is, compliance or breach of the implicit contract 
must be observable.
50  All three of these attributes appear present in the venture capital 
market. 
Although it is unlikely that a GP will have future dealings with the same 
entrepreneur,
51 as we have seen the GP will anticipate raising successor venture capital 
funds, which in turn will require future dealings with different entrepreneurs in connection 
with the investing the new funds’ capital.  The requirements of shared expectations of proper 
conduct, and the observability of a GP’s satisfaction of those expectations, also appear to be 
met in the venture capital market.  The community of venture capital funds is relatively 
concentrated,
52 and remarkably localized.  For example, the offices of a significant 
percentage of U.S. venture capital funds are found along a short strip of Sand Hill Road in 
Silicon Valley.
53  Moreover, venture capital funds typically concentrate their investments in 
portfolio companies geographically proximate to the fund’s office.
54  This geographical 
concentration of providers and users of venture capital facilitates satisfaction of the 
informational element of the structure of a reputation model.  Saxanian notes that 
geographical proximity has fostered in Silicon Valley extremely efficient informal transfers 
of information concerning the performance of GPs and entrepreneurs.
55  Credible accounts 
of opportunistic behavior by particular GPs can be expected to circulate quickly among 
members of  the entrepreneur community who must select a GP with whom to deal, and 
among members of the GP community, who must compete among themselves for the 
                                                 
50 D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. Small & Emerg. Bus. Law 
133 (1998), examines the information characteristics of the reputation market for venture capitalists.. 
51 It is not, however, impossible.  Both successful and unsuccessful first round entrepreneurs may found a 
new start-up company in need of venture capital financing.  See Annalee Saxanian, Regional Advantage: 
Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 39 (1994).  In recent years, for example, a 
familiar start up strategy has been to develop a technology designed to fit within a larger company’s 
agenda – say Cisco Systems or Microsoft – who would then acquire the start up.  In effect, the larger 
company contracts out a portion of its research and development.  An entrepreneur following this strategy 
is an obvious candidate for being a repeat player.   
52 See David J. Ben Daniel, Jesse R. Reyes, and Michael R. D’Angelo, Concentration and Conservatism 
in the Venture Capital Industry, working paper (1998).  In 1987, the top five percent of firms acting as 
venture capital fund GPs controlled 20 percent of venture capital raised.  The figure rose to 37 percent in 
1992, and to 44 percent in 1997. 
53 Saxanian, supra note 51, at 39-40.  (Over the period 1996-1999, 41 percent of all U.S. Venture Capital 
investments were made to portfolio companies located in California.  Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 
14.) 
54 Lerner, supra note 16, reports that venture capital providers located within five miles of a portfolio 
company are twice as likely to have a board representative than providers located more than 500 miles 
from a portfolio company.  See Olav Sorenson & Toby Stuart, Syndication Networks and the Spatial 
Distribution of Venture Capital Investments (Working Paper, Dec. 1999), available on SSRN at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_10=220451. 
  20opportunity to invest in the most promising portfolio companies and therefore have an 
interest in noting and transmitting to the entrepreneur community instances of misbehavior 
by a rival. 
  B.  The Investor-Venture Capital Fund Contract 
  In this Part, we turn to the investor-venture capital fund contract.  How do the 
organizational and contractual techniques discussed in Part I – virtually complete control 
vested in the GP, highly incentivized compensation, mandatory distribution of realized 
investments, and mandatory liquidation after a fixed term
56 – respond to the problems of 
financial contracting in the face of extreme forms of uncertainty, information asymmetry, 
and agency costs?
57 
  1.    Control.  Organizing the venture capital fund as a limited partnership 
serves to vest virtually complete control in the GP.  Short of participation in largely 
inconsequential advisory committees and the right, typically restricted by the limited 
partnership agreement, to replace the GP, the legal rules governing limited partnerships 
prevent investors from exercising control over the central elements of the venture capital 
fund’s business.  Most important, the investors are prohibited from insisting on an approval 
right of the GP’s investment decisions.  Thus, the venture capital fund’s formal governance 
structure presents an extreme version of the Berle-Means problem of the separation of 
ownership and control: the GP receives control grossly disproportionate to either its one 
percent capital contribution or its 20 percent carried interest. 
  The efficiency explanation for the allocation of control to the GP reflects in the first 
instance the extreme uncertainty and information asymmetry associated with investing in 
early stage, high technology portfolio companies.  By investing through a financial 
intermediary, investors secure the benefit of the GP’s skill and experience, which help to 
                                                                                                                                               
55 Saxanian, supra note 51. 
56 A form of staged financing also appears in the investor-venture capital fund contract. The limited 
partners retain the right to withdraw from completing their promised capital commitments, in effect 
staging the commitment of capital to the venture capital fund.  Id. at 502.  Sahlman, supra note 7, at 494.  
Because of the penalties associated with an investor failing to make its contribution following a capital 
call, the investor’s option to abandon is of little value compared to the fund’s option to abandon written 
by the portfolio company. 
57 Empirical evidence of the value of the organizational and contractual structure is beginning to emerge.  
Christopher Barry & L. Adel Turki, Initial Public Offerings by Development Stage Companies, 2 J. Small 
& Emerg. Bus. Laws 101 (1998), report that development stage companies that use an IPO as a substitute 
for venture capital on average experience poor long-term performance.  In contrast, the portfolios of 
venture capital funds on average earn favorable returns.  Ronald J. Gilson, Understanding the Choice 
Between Public and Private Equity Financing of Early Stage Companies:  A Comment on Barry and 
Turki, J. Small & Emerg. Bus. Law 123 (1998), suggests that the different post-transaction governance 
structures associated with the two forms of development stage financing could explain the different levels 
of performance. 
  21reduce the level of uncertainty and information asymmetry that must be addressed in the 
contract governing a portfolio company’s investment.  However, securing the benefit of the 
GP’s expertise comes at a cost:  the GP must be given the discretion necessary to exercise its 
skills and experience on the investors’ behalf.  And consistent with the principle of the 
conservation of discretion, the allocation of control to the GP creates the potential for agency 
costs that must be addressed by other elements of the venture capital fund’s organizational 
and contractual structure. 
  2.    Compensation.  The GP’s compensation structure is the front line 
response to the potential for agency costs resulting from allocating to the GP the control 
necessary to apply its skill and expertise on behalf of the investors.  As discussed in Part I, 
the bulk of the GP’s compensation comes in the form of a carried interest (20 percent of the 
venture capital fund’s ultimate profits is a common figure) distributed to the general partner 
when realized profits are distributed to the investor limited partners.  Thus, the compensation 
structure aligns the GP’s interests in the fund’s success with those of the investors: the GP 
earns returns that are proportional to those earned by the investors.  However, other agency 
problems appear in the details of the carried interest.  For example, suppose that the first 
investment realized by the venture capital fund yields a $1 million profit after a return to the 
investors of their $1 million investment.  The GP’s share of the profit is $200,000.  Now 
suppose that the next investment realized loses $500,000, leaving cumulative profits from 
the two investments of  $500,000.  If the GP keeps all of its first $200,000 distribution, then 
it ends up having received not 20 percent of the venture capital fund’s profits from the two 
investments, but 40 percent ($200,000/$500,000).  This would give the GP an incentive to 
realize profitable investments before unprofitable investments, even if that meant realizing 
the profitable investments prematurely.  Various formulations of what are called “claw back” 
provisions respond to the potential agency cost growing out of this element of uncertainty by 
in one fashion or another either delaying the GP’s distribution, or holding back some portion 
of it, so that the GP's carried interest can be finally calculated after performance is known.
58 
    3.  Mandatory Distributions and Fixed Term.  While aligning the interests of 
the GP and the investors, the intensity of the GP’s compensation incentive in turn creates a 
different agency cost.  The GP’s carried interest has option-like characteristics, which may 
cause it to prefer investments of greater risk than the investors.  This is especially true with 
respect to the fund’s later investments if the early ones have done poorly.  In that 
                                                 
58 See Halloran et al., Agreement of Limited Partnership, supra note 7, at I-64 to I-73. 
  22circumstance, the GP actually may be best served by making negative net present value 
investments if the investments are sufficiently risky.  The same problem arises with respect 
to operating decisions that concern a portfolio company that is doing poorly.  Then the 
option-like character of the GP’s carried interest may align its interests more closely with 
those of the entrepreneur whose compensation under the venture capital fund-portfolio 
company also has option-like characteristics.  In that circumstance, both the GP and the 
entrepreneur may prefer a riskier operating strategy than would best serve investors. 
The venture capital fund’s fixed term, together with the operation of the reputation 
market, responds to this agency cost problem.  The fund’s fixed term assures that at some 
point the market will measure the GP’s performance, making readily observable the extent to 
which the GP’s investment decisions favored increased risk over expected return.  A GP’s 
track record, as revealed by the performance of its previous funds, is the GP's principal tool 
for persuading investors to invest in successor funds.  Thus, the limited partnership’s fixed 
term assures that opportunistic behavior by the GP with respect to either venture capital fund 
investment decisions or portfolio company operating decisions will be punished through the 
reputation market when it seeks to raise the successor funds that justify the GP’s investment 
in skill and experience in the first place.  The expectation of such a settling up helps support 
the use of intense compensation incentives by constraining option-induced GP opportunism. 
Mandatory distribution of the proceeds from realized investments and the venture 
capital fund’s fixed term also respond to a different variety of agency costs resulting from the 
allocation of control to the GP.  Because the GP receives a fixed fee, typically in the range of 
2.5 percent, of committed capital, the GP would have an incentive to keep capital within the 
fund for as long as possible.  If given the opportunity, the GP would simply reinvest the 
proceeds of realized investments.  Moreover, that opportunity would make it unnecessary for 
GP’s to raise successor funds, the anticipation of which allows the reputation market to 
police GP performance.  Mandatory distribution of realized proceeds and a fixed term 
respond to this potential free cash flow problem.  Both devices require that the GP allow the 
investors to measure its performance against alternatives available in the market before it can 
continue managing the investors' money.  In this respect, mandatory distributions operate 
like debt in a post-leveraged buyout company:  profits must first be returned to investors 
before the company can seek to reclaim them by persuading investors to make a new 
investment.  The fixed term operates like a contractually imposed takeover by forcing the GP 
to allow the investors to choose whether the GP should continue to manage their funds.  The 
  23organizational and contractual structure assures that a time will come when market price 
serves as the measure of the GP’s performance.
59 
C.  Braiding of the Venture Capital Fund-Portfolio Company and the Investor-    
Venture Capital Fund Contracts 
A final means by which the organizational and contractual structure of the venture 
capital-portfolio company and investor-venture capital fund contracts responds to the 
contracting problems posed by extreme uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency 
costs is through the braiding of the two contracts.  By braiding I mean the fact that the 
structure of the two contracts are intertwined, each operating to provide an implicit term that 
supports the other, and thereby increasing the contractual efficiency of both.  This 
characteristic is particularly apparent with respect to the role of exit and of the reputation 
market. 
  1.  The Braiding of Exit.  As we have seen, the obligation of exit from each 
of the two contracts comprising the venture capital market – the fixed term of the investor-
venture capital fund contract, and the incentive to realize and then distribute the proceeds of 
the investment that is the subject of the venture capital fund-portfolio company contract – 
responds to contracting problems presented by each of the relationships.  Here the focus is on 
how these two functions of exit complement each other.  As we saw in Part I, by the time a 
portfolio company succeeds, the venture capital fund’s non-cash contributions to a portfolio 
company can be more profitably invested in a new round of early stage companies.  But 
because economies of scope link the provision of cash and non-cash contributions, recycling 
the non-cash contributions requires the venture capital fund to exit: to recycle its cash 
contribution from successful portfolio companies to new early stage companies.
60  
Moreover, the venture capital fund’s exit provides the means to give the entrepreneur an 
important performance incentive: a call option on control the exercise of which is 
implemented by the venture capital fund’s realization of its investment in the portfolio 
company by means of an IPO. 
In turn, the recycling of investments from successful portfolio companies to new 
early stage companies supports the investor-venture capital fund contract.  Realizing 
portfolio company investments provides a performance measure that lets investors evaluate 
                                                 
59 The absence of these characteristics help explain why closed end investment companies, like American 
Research and Development Company, the first venture capital fund formed in 1946 before the limited 
partnership structure was invented, never caught on.  See Paul Gompers, The Rise and Fall of Venture 
Capital, 23 Bus. & Econ. Hist. 1(1995). 
60 Black & Gilson, supra note 15, at 254-55. 
  24the GP’s skill and honesty, and to reallocate their funds to the GPs with the most successful 
performance.  And by providing the GP’s primary tool for persuading investors to provide 
capital for successor funds, exit supports the core of the incentive structure that aligns the 
interests of investors and the GP. 
In sum, the braiding of the role of exit in the investor-venture capital fund contract 
and the venture capital fund-portfolio company contract increases the efficiency of both 
contracts.   
  2.  The Braiding of the Reputation Market.  The venture capital fund-
portfolio company contract responds to a number of problems by shifting important elements 
of control to the venture capital fund.  The venture capital fund’s option to abandon resulting 
from staged financing, its board representation and even control, and its power to replace the 
entrepreneur, combine to reduce uncertainty and agency costs both by providing the 
entrepreneur powerful performance incentives including a call option to regain control and 
by providing the venture capital fund the means and therefore the incentive to monitor.  In 
turn, the entrepreneur’s willingness to transfer control, and to accept so heavily incentivized 
a contract structure, reduces information asymmetry by signaling the entrepreneur’s type.  
However, each of these transfers of discretion from the entrepreneur to the venture capital 
fund carries with it the potential for opportunistic behavior by the fund.  The entrepreneur is 
at risk in connection with negotiations over the terms of the next round financing, in 
connection with the venture capital fund’s exercise of control through board influence and its 
power to replace the entrepreneur, and in connection with the fund’s ability not to honor the 
implicit call option on control it has written.  The efficiency of the venture capital fund-
portfolio company contract therefore requires a credible constraint on the venture capital 
fund’s misusing its transferred discretion. 
The braiding of the venture capital fund-portfolio company contract with the 
investor-venture-capital fund contract supports a reputation market that constrains 
opportunistic behavior by the venture capital fund.  Because the fund is unlikely to engage in 
repeated deals with any particular entrepreneur, the reputation market constraint instead 
grows out of the investor-venture capital fund contract.  Because the GP needs to raise 
successor funds, it will have to make investments in new portfolio companies run by other 
entrepreneurs.  If a GP behaves opportunistically toward entrepreneurs in connection with 
previous portfolio company investments, it will lose access to the best new investments that, 
in turn, will make raising successor funds more difficult.  The impact of the GP's behavior 
toward current portfolio companies on the success of its future fund raising efforts serves to 
  25police the venture capital fund’s exercise of the discretion transferred to it in the venture 
capital fund-portfolio company contract.  In turn, the investor-venture capital fund contract’s 
support of the transfer of discretion to the fund by the venture capital fund-portfolio 
company contract helps reduce uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs in 
contracting with the portfolio company and therefore results in higher returns to investors.  
And this encourages investors to reinvest in the GP’s successor funds.  Again, the interaction 
between the two contracts supports the efficiency of each. 
 
III.  The Engineering Problem 
 
  The canvas of the U.S. venture capital contracting structure in Parts I and II 
brings me to the engineering problem.  The central lesson to be learned from the U.S. 
venture capital market is that it is overwhelmingly the product of private ordering – an 
extremely effective contracting structure that covers the entire venture capital cycle, 
from initial investment in the VC fund, to the VC fund’s investment in a portfolio 
company, to the exit from the portfolio investment to allow the VC fund’s cash and non-
cash investment to be recycled.
61  Can this model be replicated elsewhere?  Who will be 
the engineer?  Can the government act as the engineer in creating a system that is driven 
by private ordering? 
  The discussion must begin with a caveat.  I have in mind a relatively restricted 
engineering problem.  Any form of effective capital market requires a range of social, 
legal and economic institutions, such as honest courts, an effective auditing profession, 
and informational and reputational transparency, to function effectively.
62  Because of 
the braided aspect of venture capital contracting, the whole spectrum of foundational 
institutions is important to the venture capital market.  For present purposes, I will 
assume away the more difficult problem of how to engineer the foundational structure 
of capital markets, focusing instead on the more limited issue that is plainly of interest 
to many nations and multinational entities like the EU and OECD: How to engineer a 
venture capital market. 
  At this level, developing a venture capital market confronts a difficult 
coordination problem that I will call simultaneity.  A venture capital market requires the 
simultaneous availability of three factors, the provision of any one of which is 
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  26contingent on the availability of the other two.  A venture capital market requires 
entrepreneurs, investors with the funds and the taste for high-risk, high return 
investments and, as the discussion of U.S. venture capital contracting illustrates, a 
specialized financial intermediary to serve as the nexus of a set of sophisticated 
contracts. 
  The nature of the simultaneity problem can be illustrated by a more familiar 
example: the development of the U.S. credit card industry.  For a market for credit cards 
to develop, three factors were necessary.  The industry required consumers who would 
carry credit cards, merchants who would accept the cards, and a network of card issuers 
that would provide the cards and the back office services necessary to their use.  If any 
two of the three elements were available, the third would be forthcoming.  For example, 
if one observes consumers who want credit cards and a network that will provide the 
cards and the system, merchants will want to accept the cards.  The same reasoning 
applies with respect to any other permutation.  The problem is in making the first two of 
the inputs available.  The odd organizational form of the primary players in this market 
– Visa and MasterCard – seems to me to have been shaped by the need to respond to 
this problem.  By organizing as (effectively) non-profit cooperatives open to any bank, 
members could both cooperate in creating the network, while competing intensely at the 
issuer level in order to attract customers and merchants.
63 
  The government is the natural engineer to confront the venture capital 
simultaneity problem.  While the government did not play an instrumental role in the 
development of the U.S. venture capital market, the idiosyncratic U.S. experience does 
not provide an example for other countries seeking to establish a venture capital market 
more quickly than through accretion.  No institution other than the government has the 
right incentive to invest in the public good that results from establishing a venture 
capital market.  The problem, however, is the mismatch of a government acting to 
create a market in which it has no long-term role.  The response, I will argue, reflects 
the lesson of the U.S. experience and the character of the simultaneity problem.  The 
government can act to induce the development of the necessary specialized financial 
intermediaries and also act to provide, in effect, seed capital, to the new market.  That 
leaves the third factor necessary to solve the venture capital market simultaneity 
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  27problem – entrepreneurs.  Here the hypothesis is simply that the presence of a venture 
capital framework and funding will induce entrepreneurs to reveal themselves. 
  An understanding of the governmental role in engineering a venture capital 
market that I have in mind can be seen from examining governmental efforts in three 
different countries: one early German failure that got every element wrong and whose 
failure highlights the shape of what is necessary for a successful government effort; a 
more recent Israeli effort that got much of the structure right; and a current Chilean 
program that was structured with precisely this analysis in mind.  These examples are 
not intended to be illustrative of the wide range of government efforts to create a 
venture capital market.  Rather, the goal is to highlight what is necessary for a 
successful effort. 
  A. The German “WFG” Experience 
  The German WFG program
64 provides a fascinating example of an early effort 
to create a national venture capital market that failed miserably.  The nature of its 
failings, and its mirror image of the core of U.S. venture capital contracting, provides 
important guidance on the limits of governmental engineering. 
  Formed in 1975 at the insistence of the German federal government and with the 
express goal of developing a German venture capital market, WFG began with 10 
million DM in funding, ultimately increased to 50 million DM, that was provided by 29 
German banks, including the largest banks and the leading savings and loan institutions.  
The banks’ involvement was encouraged not just by governmental pressure, but also by 
a generous government guarantee: the government insured up to 75 percent of WFG’s 
losses.  As an inducement to entrepreneurs, WFG’s return from a successful portfolio 
company investment was capped by the requirement that the entrepreneur be granted a 
call option to purchase WFG’s position at cost plus a moderate interest rate.  Thus, 
WFG had quite muted incentives to make successful investments.  It was protected on 
the downside by the government guarantee, and limited on the upside to a moderate 
interest rate – a low risk (because of the guarantee) and a low return (because of the call 
option) investment, a strange vehicle indeed for investing in early stage, technology 
companies whose essential characteristic is their high risk. 
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  28  WFG’s governance structure reflected the program’s government origin – a 
stakeholders’ dream of a compromise.  WFG had a twelve person board, comprised of 
two industry members, three bank members, three government members representing 
the ministries of commerce, finance, and research and development, two management 
consultants, and two scientists.  A mixed board committee selected the projects to be 
funded, pursuant to quite general criteria that nonetheless pointed in the right direction.  
The focus was to be on the innovative character of the project’s technology, the 
existence of attractive commercial applications, and the quality of the entrepreneur. 
  WFG’s investments were structured to be passive, perhaps because the return 
character of its investment gave it no incentive to be active.  Only minority investments 
were made, and WFG received no control rights at all, even over important decisions.  
Consistent with this passive structure, WFG personnel provided no technological or 
management assistance to their portfolio companies even though the board members 
appeared to have the credentials to be useful. 
  Comparing U.S. venture capital practices with those of WFG reveals dramatic 
differences along every important dimension.  Indeed, it would have been difficult for 
WFG to get the structure any more wrong.
65 
  In the U.S., the venture capital contracting structure turns the Berle & Means 
problem on its head.  Instead of less control than equity, venture capital investors in the 
U.S. take significant control positions, more than proportional to their equity.  Not only 
do they obtain veto rights over major decisions, retain the continuation decision, and 
often control a majority of the board, but they also retain the right to terminate the 
entrepreneur.  In contrast, WFG took a minority position in portfolio companies and 
obtained no control rights.  An example highlights the difference.  A recent study of a 
sample of Silicon Valley portfolio companies show that professional managers replace 
more than half of founding entrepreneurs.
66  WFG never replaced an entrepreneur. 
  Control and equity give U.S. venture capitalists the means and incentives to 
monitor highly incentivized managers.  A twenty percent carried interest based on a 1 
percent capital contribution gives them a huge stake in the upside.  The impact of 
portfolio company failure on a venture capitalists’ ability to raise subsequent funds and, 
hence, on the value of their human capital, assures that they also share the downside. 
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  29 WFG lacked both the incentives to succeed and the means to monitor.  Given 
the government guarantee and the enterpreneurs’ call option, why should the banks 
bother to monitor?  In all events, WFG lacked levers of control to act even if monitoring 
led to discovery of a problem.  Control and equity also give U.S. venture investors the 
incentive to provide non-capital inputs to portfolio companies.  WFG provided nothing 
but its initial capital investment. 
The same dampening of WFG’s incentives plainly influenced project selection 
as well.  As already stressed, WFG’s position was largely insulated from a portfolio 
company’s performance.  Not surprisingly, the same incentive pattern repeated itself at 
the level of the individual decision makers within WFG.  No member of the board 
selection committee was either rewarded or penalized for WFG performance. 
In short, WFG was a government program that created a financial intermediary 
that had no incentives, did not monitor, involved the government, through board 
representation, in project selection and, not surprisingly, produced dismal results.  Over 
its lifetime, WFG experienced an internal rate of return of negative 25.07 percent.  In 
every year of its existence, proceeds from the government guarantee exceeded revenue 
from investments.  In terms of addressing the simultaneity problem, WFG generated 
funds for venture investing, but created a hollow financial intermediary that was 
incapable of playing the central role that the U.S. venture capital contracting system 
contemplates.  Keep in mind that a significant negative return for WFG necessarily 
parallels significant failures for the entrepreneurs who WFG funded.  A pattern of 
failure will not call forth entrepreneurs. 
B. The Israeli Yozma Program 
In contrast to the early WFG program, a more recent Israeli program came closer 
to getting the incentive structure right.
67  Plainly influenced by the U.S. experience, the 
Israeli government established Yozma Ltd. in 1993 with the intention of creating the 
infrastructure for an Israeli venture capital market.  In particular, Yozma created nine 
venture capital funds, in which it invested along with private investors. The structure of 
Yozma’s participation in these funds was quite different than both the German 
government’s and the banks’ participation in WFG. 
First, Yozma provided no guarantee against loss.  Rather, Yozma provided 
capital to the funds, matching up to 40 percent of the capital invested by private 
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  30investors.  Thus, unlike WFG, private investors and the fund’s managers bore their 
share of the downside risk. 
Second, the Yozma structure preserved intense performance incentives on the 
upside.  Like WGF, Yozma’s return on its investment was capped: the private investors 
had a call option on Yozma’s investment at cost plus (i) a nominal interest rate and (ii) 
and seven percent of the future profits from portfolio company investments in which the 
fund was then invested.  This cap, however, had very different incentive properties than 
the cap on WFG’s return.  Because Yozma’s investment was made in a venture capital 
fund, rather than directly in the portfolio company as with WFG, and because the call 
option was held by the other investors rather than by the entrepreneur as with WFG, the 
returns to the financial intermediary were not capped at all.  Rather, the cap served to 
leverage the returns, and therefore the incentives, of the intermediary instead of 
dampening them.  WFG’s subsidy to the banks and to the entrepreneur eliminated any 
incentive for WFG or its constituent banks to monitor the entrepreneur’s conduct.  In 
contrast, Yozma’s subsidy to other investors increased their incentive to assure that the 
portfolio companies were carefully monitored. 
Finally, Yozma did not make investment decisions.
68  The fund’s managers 
selected the portfolio companies in which the fund would invest.  Thus, while Yozma’s 
investments were passive like those of WFG, these passive investments were made 
through funds whose managers and other investors were highly incentivized.  In this 
critical respect, the Yozma structure tracked the U.S. pattern of interposing a highly 
incentivized intermediary between passive investors and the portfolio company. 
Yozma’s performance was consistent with this more highly incentivized 
investment structure.  Investment decisions were made by those who bore the 
investment’s risk and return.  The Yozma funds ultimately increased in size to over 
$200 million and in 1997 were successfully privatized. 
C. The Current Chilean CORFU Program 
  A Chilean program begun in 2001, “designed to provide an incentive for the 
development of venture capital funding in Chile,”
69 takes the Yozma concept a step 
further in the direction of the U.S. venture capital contracting model.  The program 
contemplates that a government agency, the Corporation for the Incentive of Production 
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  31(“CORFU”), will invest in privately managed venture capital funds organized roughly 
in accordance with the U.S. model.  The fund manager’s compensation has the same 
structure as developed in the U.S. – a 2.5 percent fixed annual fee on assets under 
management and a carried interest based on fund performance.  Perhaps because of the 
early stage of the Chilean venture capital market, the program has a number of features 
that seem to be substitutes for the operation of a reputation market among venture 
capitalists.   
First, the CORFU program seeks to insure more direct investor monitoring of 
the fund manager’s performance rather than relying only on the structure of the fund 
manager’s incentives and its investment in reputation.  Each fund must have at least five 
unrelated investors holding at least ten percent of the fund’s equity each, or at least one 
institutional investor holding at least 20 percent of the equity.  By requiring the presence 
of large investors, the structure encourages internal monitoring of the fund manager. 
Second, because the fund manager is likely to have a smaller investment in 
reputation at this stage of the development of a national venture capital market, the 
CORFU program requires a larger capital investment by the fund manager than the U.S. 
pattern of a one percent capital contribution by the general partner.  The Chilean 
program requires the fund manager to invest at least fifteen percent of the fund 
manager’s total assets in the managed fund.  Note that the requirement is keyed to a 
percentage of the fund manager’s assets, not of the fund’s assets, an effort plainly 
directed to insure that even new fund managers – most local venture capitalists would 
necessarily be new – have a direct share of the downside. 
CORFU investment in qualifying venture capital funds takes the form of “loans” 
that leverage the private investors’ and the fund manager’s equity stakes in the fund.  
While denominated loans, the CORFU contribution is functionally preferred equity with 
a cap on return.  The loan accrues interest at 3 percent with a term equal to the shorter of 
the life of the fund or 15 years.  No interest or principal payment is due until the fund 
makes a distribution to shareholders, and final payment occurs on liquidation.  CORFU 
has a distribution preference, receiving on liquidation first its principal and interest, 
following which the private investors receive an amount equal to their original 
investment.
70  Then CORFU receives an amount equal to an annualized return of nine 
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  32percent on the principal of the loan.  The remaining funds are paid to the private 
investors and the fund manager. 
Like the Yozma program, the Chilean program provides a subsidy to fund 
investors, including fund managers, through capping its return on its investment.  
Again, unlike the WFG program, the key feature of the CORFU program is its focus on 
the incentives of the financial intermediary.  CORFU remains a passive investor in a 
venture capital fund whose investment structure, patterned after the U.S. model, is 
plainly intended to encourage the kind of active venture capital fund – portfolio 
company relationship found in the U.S.
71  
 
IV.  A Template for Government Engineering of a Venture Capital Market 
 
  These three examples, together with the lessons of the U.S. venture capital 
contracting model, provide guidance in constructing a rough template for government 
efforts to engineer a venture capital market.  The strategy reflects a central theme: the 
government should address the simultaneity problem by providing seed capital and 
helping to create the necessary financial intermediaries that together will encourage the 
supply of entrepreneurs, while at the same time maintaining the pattern of intense 
incentives coupled with intense monitoring that characterizes U.S. venture capital 
contracting. 
  A. The Template 
  Extending both the Yozma insight and the Chilean CORFU program, the 
government would issue a request for proposals for venture capital funds with the goal 
of selecting a number of funds run by competing professionals.  The structure of these 
funds, and the structure of the fund-portfolio company contract, would generally track 
the U.S. pattern.  A requirement of matching non-governmental investors, as reflected in 
the CORFU program, provides interested monitors of the fund manager in the period 
prior to the operation of an effective reputation market. 
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71 The author is grateful to LatinValley.com, the first fund manager to participate in the CORFU program, 
for copies of the program documentation.  Prior to the adoption of the CORFU program, the author and 
principals in LatinValley.com made a presentation to the Economics Minister of Chile suggesting a 
general approach toward encouraging a Chilean venture capital market similar to that reflected in the 
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  33  Under this arrangement, the fund managers would have the incentive to seek out 
promising entrepreneurs, the experience to provide non-monetary assistance in the 
development of the portfolio companies and, given the fixed term of the fund, the 
obligation to exit the investment when their non-capital inputs were no longer 
necessary.  In turn, the government’s participation as a passive investor in the fund 
allows the government to provide funds to the new market, but without itself 
participating in the capital allocation process. 
  This requirement of allocative passivity is central to carving out an effective 
governmental role in engineering a venture capital market.  The most important flaw in 
the WFG model was the German government’s creation of a financial intermediary with 
essentially no incentives to succeed.  Direct funding by the government, the most 
common form of government assistance to creating an entrepreneurial sector, has the 
potential to make things even worse through a kind of Gresham’s law.  Like WFG, the 
operators of  direct government programs typically will lack the incentives to carefully 
monitor portfolio company management and also will be subject to political pressure 
over issues like management replacement and job maintenance.  Additionally, those 
running direct government programs are unlikely to have the experience and incentives 
to provide portfolio companies non-capital inputs (and efforts by the government, for 
example, to influence the decisions of potential suppliers to the portfolio company 
would run the obvious risk of political, as opposed to reputational, pressure).   
To make matters worse, the flaws that arise from the government acting as the 
financial intermediary may well be attractive to entrepreneurs, who often view the 
monitoring and intervention of venture capitalists as unwanted intrusions.  The best 
entrepreneurs may then prefer the government program to private venture capital funds, 
and more frequently fail because they will lack the benefits associated with an 
experienced financial intermediary and a proper incentive and monitoring structure.  
This leaves the less talented entrepreneurs to the private sector, who also will fail more 
frequently, thereby discouraging development of private sector financial intermediaries 
and decreasing the supply of entrepreneurs.  In short, a misconceived government plan 
can operate perversely to actually discourage the development of a private venture 
capital market. 
To be sure, even if the government invests in a private venture capital fund that 
formally allocates the government a passive role, a realist would fear that the 
government still might try to influence the selection of portfolio companies (and the 
  34interaction between the venture capital fund and the portfolio company) informally 
through the implicit promise of future government funding.  Such an effort presents the 
fund manager with a tradeoff.  Fund managers whose initial efforts are successful will 
have the capacity to attract private investors for future funds; in other words, the market 
makes an implicit promise of future investment conditioned only on performance and 
without the risk of opportunistic breach.  In contrast, making politically influenced 
portfolio decisions reduces the likelihood of the fund’s success, thereby reducing the 
value of fund manager’s carried interest.  In turn, the reduced success of the fund makes 
it more difficult for the fund manager to secure private investors for future funds.   
The result, then, of acceding to the government’s effort at informal influence is 
to substitute the government’s implicit promise of future funding for that of the market.  
A fund manager would have reason to question the credibility of the government’s 
implicit promise – implicit promises typically require the support of reputational 
sanction for breach that is lacking in the government setting.  Moreover, the reduced 
access to the market for future funding as a result of reduced success due to government 
meddling serves to render the fund manager’s human capital investment specific to its 
relation with the government, thereby creating the potential for subsequent opportunistic 
conduct by the government.  To be sure, a government retains the means to pressure 
fund managers if it loses sight of why it is engaged in the effort to engineer a venture 
capital market in the first place, but that is true of any government involvement, and the 
proposed structure both limits that effort to the informal, and creates important 
incentives for the fund manager to resist. 
This model of channeling government efforts to assist in creating a market into 
passive investment through incentivized intermediaries has an interesting, if inadvertent, 
precedent in the United States.  Early in the development of the leveraged buyout 
movements, state pension funds were among Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts earliest 
investors.
72  These early passive investments in KKR had the unintended consequence 
of providing government support for the development of a private equity market, 
through an intensely incentivized financial intermediary, with precisely the results 
hoped for here:  successful performance by early KKR funds both attracted much more 
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funds, and generally fueled the private equity market’s restructuring of U.S. industry.
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V.  Qualifications and Conclusion 
 
  Any effort at financial engineering should close with qualifications.  However 
clever the blueprint, there will always be more moving parts than the engineers 
contemplate.  In the case of a government effort to engineer a venture capital market 
through passive investment in a highly incentivized intermediary, the qualification 
concerns the premise that derives from how I framed the simultaneity problem.  The 
supply of entrepreneurs was treated as solely a function of the availability of funds and 
specialized intermediaries – if we build it, the entrepreneurs will come.  But what about 
an entrepreneurial culture as a precondition of a venture capital market?  Why not a 
three factor simultaneity model, instead of only two? 
  Two recent papers assessing the slow development of a German venture capital 
market, even after funds and intermediaries were said to be available, argue that 
Germany lacked the appropriate entrepreneurial culture, with those having the skills 
necessary to form technology based start-ups lacking the tolerance for uncertainty 
critical to leaving the nest of large firm employment.  In this view, the final elements 
necessary to launch a German early stage venture capital market was the internet 
explosion and a large number of Germans having been exposed to the United States 
business culture, especially through business school training.
74 
  To some extent the cultural criticism can be deflected.  One characterization of 
the criticism is that the success of venture capital-backed internet start-ups changed the 
culture, thereby providing the final element necessary to engineering a venture capital 
market.  But this is simply rephrasing the simultaneity analysis I have offered, albeit 
with an intermediate step the addition of: providing capital and incentivized financial 
intermediaries attracts some entrepreneurs whose success, in turn, attracts still more 
entrepreneurs.  Stated more generally, a cultural change occurs between the 
government’s engineering effort and the appearance of the market. 
                                                 
73 Id. 
74 Becker & Hellmann, supra note 64; Marc-Oliver Fiedler & Thomas Hellmann, Against All Odds: The 
Late But Rapid Development of the German Venture Capital Industry (forthcoming, Journal of Private 
Equity). 
  36  I readily confess to discomfort with too easy a recourse to culture as an 
explanation for when a high technology venture capital market (or any other economic 
institution) develops.
75  Too many degrees of freedom are left with respect to the 
direction of causation and with respect to defining the variables.  Nonetheless, I can not 
avoid a nagging doubt that my three-factor simultaneity model, like the two-factor asset 
pricing model, may turn out to be analytically lovely but empirically challenged.
76  
Different countries may respond quite differently to the same engineering efforts.  As 
with the two-factor asset pricing model, other factors may explain the empirical results 
in ways that turn out to be difficult to explain analytically even though their presence is 
revealed empirically.  Should that prove true, the consolation will be that the 
engineering effort still will have taught us something important by more clearly framing 
the phenomenon that then needs explanation, but now with a range of experience in 
different countries that will require more disciplined analysis than the cultural account 
has provided to date. 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 See Black & Gilson, supra note 15, at 271-72; Ronald J. Gilson & Mark Roe, Lifetime Employment: 
Labor Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 508, 517 (1999). 
76 The respected economic historian Peter Temin makes the case for a culturally embedded approach to 
economic history.  See Peter Temin, Is it Kosher to Talk about Culture?, 57 J. Econ. Hist. 267 (1997)  
However, his account leaves open the devilish issues of causation.  It would hardly be surprising that 
cultural mores and economic institutions generally are consistent, thereby leaving the causative issue 
open.  The more interesting and unusual circumstance is when they differ. 
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